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Sinkiang All

II. Stability of the Societies in the Northwest

It is safe to say that the minorities of Sinkiang, Chinghai and Kansu represent rather unstable societies. This instability has several causes. The first is certainly the fact that the Turks, the Mongols and the Tibetans consider themselves utterly different from the Chinese in regard to race, religion, language, and ethnic grouping; therefore they desire independence and do not want to be ruled by "aliens," which they consider the Chinese to be. The second reason for instability is the progressive settling and colonization by Chinese peasants who cut down the pasture areas of the nomadic Mongols, Turks, and Tibetans, and consequently provoke hatred against themselves. The third reason for the unstable character of the societies of the Northwest was the reckless taxation of the minorities by many Chinese officials who considered their offices in areas like Sinkiang and Chinghai as an opportunity to gain wealth while holding those offices for a limited number of years. In periods of wars, the minorities were subject to merciless requisition of their cattle and agricultural products. In addition to the friction and animosity between the minorities and the Chinese, the disunion among the minorities themselves was at times considerable. As an illustration one might remember that during the uprisings of the Dungans between 1931 and 1936, the Chinese Muslims fought against Turkic Muslims (which supposedly represent a single religious unit), Mongols, Chinese, and White Russians fought against the Chinese Muslims (Dungans) and the Kirghiz and Kazakhs even formed a special unit and fought against both groups or joined one of the two according to the military situation, opportunistically. This period was without doubt the culmination of disunion and confusion among minorities of the Northwest during the last decades.

On the other hand, when a governor who was more interested in the welfare of the country as such than in his own enrichment, like Sheng Shi-ts'ai of Sinkiang, with a cleaner officialdom, ruled the province, the society gave a more stable impression and the frictions between the various nationalities decreased.

A further reason for the disunion of the society in the Northwest is the incompatibility of various religions, especially the "martial" Islam on the one hand and the more peaceful Buddhism on the other. The Muslims feel superior to any other religious community; the Buddhists (Mongols, Tibetans, Shera Yögurs, Monguors) consider the Muslims as having a barbarian religion; the Chinese, generous and tolerant in regard to religions consider at least Islam to be somewhat inferior to their own multi-religious conceptions and beliefs.

SN 563 182 The Chinese, fully aware of their old culture and history, continued up to our times to consider Mongols, Turks and Tibetans if not as barbarians, at least as inferior peoples. This attitude of the Chinese caused, perhaps as an understandably psychological reaction, the superiority-complex behaviour of some minorities. In addition, the higher efficiency and diligence of the average Chinese peasant in comparison with the average non-Chinese did not help mutual understanding and esteem.

SN 563 668 [641] Constitutionally, for the first time in centuries, the minorities are not only considered by the present Communistic regime as absolutely equal to any other racial or ethnic group but they are also treated with consideration. The Communists do everything in order to avoid hurting the nationalistic feeling of the minorities. The price the minorities SN [177] have to pay for a certain degree of local self-determination, independence and self-government is the thorough acceptance of the party line with all its consequences, above all, collectivization, which certainly means an incredible change of the traditional economic pattern, because eight ninths of the total population are peasants and only the remaining one ninth are pastoral nomads, whose livestock - collectivization is yet to come.

SN 563 829 Since the overwhelming majority of the population of the Northwest consists of Chinese, the attitude toward the state in general is positive. Natural recognition of the government lies in the traditional line of Chinese behavior. The deep-rooted respect for "magistracy" and officialdom implies this basic recognition.

SN 563 668 578 669 The relationship between Chinese Communist rulers and ruled Chinese (whether Communist or not) might be described as less frictional than that between the non-Chinese minorities and the Chinese Communist rulers, that is, a certain tension and uneasiness between the Uighur Autonomous Region and the government has occurred several times during the last five years, and also between the Tibetans of Chinghai and the Communist authorities, and the recent uprisings of Tibetans (July 1956) seem to be of major significance.

SN 829 Generally speaking, the average Chinese in the Northwest has neither a sense of common destiny or any sense of mission.

SN 829 829 571 The average Chinese peasant's life is concerned with one main and urgent problem: livelihood. Quite different is the situation among the intelligentsia, who are culture conscious to such a degree that it often results in a feeling of superiority over other peoples. Among those intellectuals there is a strong feeling and conviction that China has a grand mission in Asia - cultural and political leadership.

668 Based on our experience with Soviet Russia, there can be
186 little doubt that the Chinese Communist propaganda has been,
or will be, successful in building up a tremendous feeling
for nation and nationality, an artificial and overemphasized
N pride for everything which is China or Chinese. The Chinese society
• 182 in the Northwest might be described as stable and united because
of its common history, common language, common beliefs,
common pattern of living (agriculture by means of irrigation
accounting for ninety-five percent) and common fate. We do not
refer to the artificial stability and unity enforced by secret
police and military garrisons which might turn into a genuine
stability like that in Russia after a long period of propaganda.
Training of the younger generation and making propagandistic
use of political mistakes committed by other powers, like
Hitler's lost war against Russia, which was the last step in
N developing a final and real unity among Russians.

563 Turning back to the minorities, we can say that the Turks
795 and the Chinese Muslims do have a sense of mission in
797 regard to their religion. For centuries the Muslim has been
668 taught to fight and to convert the "non-believers" to the "only
true faith on earth": Islam (Mohammedanism). How strong
their feeling is in regard to their religion may be seen from
the fact that the Communist regime avoids carefully interference
in religious matters and even permits every religious activity
to continue, including the pilgrimage to Mecca. Of course,
the average Muslim is hardly aware of the fact that the top
S level Muslim leadership is under complete control of the Com-
563 munist regime. As a religious group the Turks (Eastern
795 Turks, Salars, Kirghiz, Kazakhs and some small islamized
Tibetan clans) and the Dungans (Chinese Muslims) are united
to a certain degree and they do have a sense of common
destiny, repeatedly brought forward, when political events
showed that they considered themselves one single group,
imbued with common fate, which culminated in their idea
and highest aim: the attempt to erect their own Islamic
Empire and realm, an attempt which cost hecatombs of blood
but never came true. Their perception and conviction that
the support of their highest spiritual leaders, first the Caliph
of Baghdad, then the Sultan of Constantinople and finally the
Great Mufti of Jerusalem (in spite of Stalin's and Ata Turk's
discouraging denoucement of any Pan-Islamic or Pan-Turkic
movement) developed their group feeling and group conscious-
N ness.

563 As far as the Mongols of the Northwest are concerned, it
N can be stated that because of their geographical separation
[795] (see map of ethnic groups) political disunion was inevitable.
However, as an ethnic and religious group (the Mongols are

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*175 under the Ch'ing emperors, reasserted its sway in Turkestan.
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4. Pattern of nomadic expansion and contraction

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175 Wave after wave of nomadic peoples have made their appear-
648 ances and then faded away, leaving the imprint of their stay on the pa'impeest of Turkestan. The pattern of their entry, their ascendency, and heir exit have been similar. Each outburst and withdrawal of the nomads showed but variations on the major theme. The Huns, the Turks, and the Mongols, to mention a few of the more powerful of the plethora of nomadic peoples, all had their geneses in the same region, an area of Mongolia south of Lake Baikal. The process of their rise to power followed parallel lines. First, there was a bitter internecine struggle from which one group emerged triumphant. Second, the nomadic tribes were unified into a strong coalition under the leadership of the dominant group. Third, they expanded outward from the steppes into neighboring regions, especially into the marginal zone of modern Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia. Then they consolidated these areas into bases of operation for the fourth stage, the invasion and, when successful, the conquest of the opulent agrarian lands. At the peak of their strength, these nomadic invaders would establish a strong, militant empire, under an absolutist government, to control the motley subject peoples under their domination.

But once they reached the peak of their power, the downgrade began. The paucity of their numerical strength made it difficult for them to hold large territories. The tradition of intertribal contest instilled the spirit of independence in the minds of the satraps appointed to rule portions of the far-flung empires. The failure to resolve the incompatibility between pastoral and agrarian economy, and the resentment and rebellious tendency of the subject peoples whom the conquerers were only able to overawe by military strength, were all factors which brought about the disintegration and decline of the empires of the nomads.

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175 5. Theories concerning nomadic eruptions
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648 What accounted for the sudden irresistible ferocity of nomad eruptions and what accounted for the docility of their withdrawal? A number of very ingenious theorires have been advanced, as answers to this intriguing question, but so far these are still in the realm of assumptions.

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175 Many scholars have regarded the influence of climate as a
121 possible cause of the high tide and ebb of nomadic activities.
648 Superimposed on the progressive dessication of Central Asia
132 resulting from the withdrawal of glaciers, were the minor cyclic
114 fluctuations of alternating dry and moist spells. A climatologist
● 182 (C.E.P. Brooks) spoke of the "classical rainfall period of 640 years," and a geographer (Raymond Wheeler) believed in a major alternation of dry and cold every 510 years. Ellsworth Huntington,

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a proponent of the theory of climatic alternations, called the phenomenon "the pulse of Asia."

The most important of the multiple influences is believed to be that of the economic effects of climatic changes. When the climate is warm and moist, the land of the nomads is fertile enough to support the nomads and their herds, but when the climate becomes drier and colder, the rivers and lakes shrink and the pasturage is reduced. This cuts down the food supply and forces the nomads to rampage into the land of their neighbors. Speaking of the thirteenth century, Arnold Toynbee declared that the "paroxysm of aridity coincided in date with the demoniac eruption of the Mongols, and it will be seen that the physiographical recoil towards humidity likewise corresponds in date with the rapid ebb of the Mongols." (A Study of History, vol. III, p. 439).

Although the outbursts and recessions of the nomads were periodic, the rigid periodization was too mechanical and many scholars have discredited climate as the sole factor. Huntington suggests that four factors may have impelled the huge migration of the nomadic peoples, namely: climate, the inherent quality of the people especially as manifested by the leaders, the pull exerted by the wealth and the opportunities of the agricultural lands, and the push exerted by over-population. (Mainsprings of Civilization, p. 568).

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A period of peace and prosperity would allow the population of the nomads to increase. However, in the desolate steppes, food was dependent upon flocks of sheep and herds of cattle and horses, and the people, unlike their sedentary neighbors, did not have the tradition nor the facilities for food storage. Any sudden change in climate which caused a reduction of pasturage and water supply would create a "time of troubles" and compel the nomadic people to migrate in search of food and pasturage.

When the nomads were experiencing a "time of troubles," the lush riches and the military weakness of the settled peoples would tempt border tribes to encroach upon the agrarian regions. Distress and discontent at home and the lure of wealth abroad furnish the push and the pull of Toynbee's theories. When the leavening of bold leadership and ideas were added, the nomads often were induced to burst out from the steppes of Asia and to set the world in commotion.

Other scholars entirely discount the influence of climate and seek the explanation for the advance and withdrawal of the nomads in social and political conditions. Owen Lattimore, who has given much thought to this question, (cf. Inner Asian Frontiers, passim), lists a number of reasons other than climate, for the eruption of the nomads. There were, for example, technological factors like the invention of the powerful compound bow and the technique of mounted archery which gave the nomads an edge over their enemies.

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The Chinese had to adopt the nomad bow and the technique of mounted archery before they could meet the nomads on equal terms.

Another factor, according to Lattimore, was the pastoral economy of the nomads which led to migration. Horses and cattle cannot graze on field that have been cropped by sheep and goats. Therefore, the nomads whose livelihood depended upon their herds and flocks, must continually seek new pastures. The claims to pasturelands and the right of movement led to wars. The continuous wars stimulated the rise of leaders, hard-headed men who survived the hurly-burly of warfare and politics of the steppes and deserts. Finally, a supreme leader emerged who would then weld the various groups into a grand confederation strong enough to encroach upon the neighboring regions for land, for the profits of trade, and for revenue and tribute from the conquered peoples.

According to Lattimore, the nomads who invaded the marginal zone between the steppes and the settled lands, were not pure nomads but were semi-settled. Their wars of conquest were not only for pastures for their herds and flocks but for land, for the riches of the cities, and for the proceeds of commerce. Moreover, the cycles of their invasion and retreat began only a few centuries before the Christian era when they split from the settled peoples on China's northwestern frontier and when they acquired the technology of nomadic warfare. The true nomads on the steppes evolved from the mixed nomads, not vice versa.

The migrations which led to conquest over a wide area, such as those carried out by the Huns, the Turks and the Mongols, normally did not begin with the true nomads but with the mixed nomads, and were caused by (1) a group breaking away from the mixed nomads in order to become true nomads; or (2) a group breaking away from the true nomads in order to revert back to mixed nomadism. The Huns, Turks, and Mongols had fixed bases of operation and their conquests were for land.

Under these circumstances, according to Lattimore, the cycles of nomadic expansion and withdrawal each went through the following process:

1. The maintenance of large armies of mounted warriors to conquer land for the profit of trade and revenue from subject peoples;
2. A dichotomy of nomad society. The nomadic warriors who went forth to conquer and who were left to garrison conquered territories had control of the sources of wealth but declined militarily. The warriors who stayed in the steppes as the military reserve continued to be warlike but gradually became impoverished;
3. A split within the nomad state between those in the conquered areas and those in the steppes, leading to decline and and withdrawal.

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6. Summary

In summary, the workings of the historical process represented

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in these tides of nomadic eruptions can hardly be explained by one set of factors, useful as it may be as a contribution to our understanding of this process. Moreover, each set in turn led into a rather involved pattern. Geography and the highly specialized economies of the nomads, particularly when they had reached the stage of pure nomadism, induced them to seek a more stable base for their evolving power urge than could be found in the steppe lands of Mongolia, from which most of the nomadic conquests emerged. It induced them to push first into the oasis situation of Turkestan with its mixed, richer, more stable but, geographically speaking, more fragmented economy. This aspect helped form the pattern of relationships of the group, which was on its way to conquest of other nomadic or semi-nomadic peoples in Central Asia. However, only from the foundation of this economic basis could an effort at conquest of neighboring civilizations be sustained.

The social pattern of development leading a warrior leader to integrate his clan, his tribe, his people, and finally, a confederation of peoples, into a conquest force is interlinked with the previous one. This expansion led to a relative shrinkage of the group that had been carrier of the power urge and more and more force had to be substituted for the self-consciousness of the participants and their community of purpose. In the course of the social development towards conquest and empire building, the initial group gained a feeling of mission but lost its surroundings geographically, economically, and socially. As a rule this change also led to a change in the pattern of emerging leadership: the warrior leader chosen by his own people had to make room for the heir of a diversified empire.

This development again was linked with the development of a relationship to neighboring agricultural societies, particularly China, a relationship that has been understood under the concept of marginality by Krader (The Cultural and Historical Position of the Mongols, Asia Major 3, 1952, 169-183). Economically speaking, this relationship is always one of interdependence. From the Chinese side the natural and necessary exchange of produce was conceived under an evolving series of patterns. In periods of Chinese power ascendancy the nomadic raid pattern was transformed into trade, then into tribute, and then, if necessary, into conquest. However, in periods when a nomadic empire building situation coincided with a decline of Chinese power, the nomads would shake off conquest, resort to raids and to conquest in their turn.

Whatever may have been the causes of the periodic eruption of the nomads, whether they were due to climatic changes or due to concentration and the disintegration of nomadic society, the pattern remained. With clockwork regularity different groups of

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nomads have descended on the marginal zones, such as Turkestan and Inner Mongolia, conquering and absorbing some peoples and pushing others, in a sort of chain reaction, until the reverberations were felt from China Proper in the east to Russia in the west. The history of China's great Northwest cannot be clearly delineated without tracing in broad sweep the see-saw of power between China and the nomadic peoples.

C. Early History to 1644

1. Chou Dynasty

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In antiquity the Northwest region of China was known as the province of Yung, one of the nine provinces of ancient China. For a long time, it was a region inhabited by peoples whom the Chinese called "barbarians," the Ti in the north and the Jung in the west. The founder of the Chou Dynasty, King Wen (circa 12th century B.C.) was himself a "western barbarian." His fief in the Wei River Valley in Shensi, an area which in the early years of Chinese civilization was fertile and fruitful, provided his son, King Wu, with the men and resources for the campaign to gain control over China. Later, as the barbarians of the Northwest became strong, they forced the Chou court to transfer its capital from the Wei River Valley to Honan.

2. Ch'in Dynasty

The region of Shensi, centering around the Wei River Valley, became the fief of the Marquis (later Duke) of Ch'in. The bountiful resources of the region, enhanced further by the development of irrigation, the militant nature of the people who were part Hun, and the administrative and social reforms initiated by Legalist ministers enabled Ch'in to rise to power, to triumph over the other feudal states in 221 B.C., to conquer the empire and establish the first centralized government over China. Ch'ang-an (now Sian), the erstwhile capital of the Chou kings, became the national capital of a mighty empire from this time on, down through the Han, Sui and T'ang Dynasties.

Under the Ch'in state and later the Ch'in empire, the Chinese began to extend their power up the Kansu Corridor and into the regions of the modern provinces of Ninghsia and Chinghai. In the north, they completed the Great Wall to fend off the northern barbarians and to protect their flanks as they advanced westward. The advances made during the Ch'in Dynasty, which fell in 209 B.C., prepared the way for the great expansion of the Chinese into Turkestan during the Han period.

3. Han Dynasty

With the consolidation of Chinese unity a new power arose among the barbarians of the Northwest. This was the confederation of nomadic tribes formed under the leadership of the Hsiung-nu or Huns. During the civil war which overthrew the Ch'in

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GEOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND

I. The Physical Setting

A. Location and Importance.

13 Lanchou, the capital of Kansu, is the geographic center of China. If one draws a horizontal line from west to east and a vertical line from south to north, he finds that the northwest quarter of China just covers the whole area of Sinkiang, Kansu, and Chinghai or Koko Nor. Owing to scanty rainfall, a great part of the area is a vast desert, dotted with oases and strips of cultivation, It is generally classified as the interior continental desert and steppe region of China.

771 184 From the viewpoint of geographic location, Northwest China, especially Kansu Province, is a transitional zone of cultural variations. Religions, for example, are different. From Kansu northwestward to Sinkiang, the majority of the inhabitants are Mohammedans. Contrarily, southeastward to China proper, there is more Buddhism and Christianity.

241 233 182 Again, Kansu furnishes a natural boundary for economies. From the eastern end of Kansu southeastward the area is mainly agricultural, while the area northwest from Kansu is largely a pastoral region. People there are adapted to a nomadic life with a relatively self-sufficient economy. As a result, the trading activity is small. It is limited to a small village or an isolated oasis.

131 The area is adjacent to the Mongolian People's Republic on the north and northwest and the Tibetan Plateau on the southwest. Moreover, it lies in the path of direct communication with Soviet Russia through the narrow plain of the Kansu Corridor by way of Sinkiang in the extreme northwest. It is an important part of China as a strategic pivot linking Asia and Europe and it is the great joint between Inner Asia and the Pacific coast.

133 B. Surface Features.

The physical features of northwest China generally may be classified as plateaus. However, viewed in terms of the present relief of Kansu, the high lands are all located along the southern border of the province. They are generally called the Ch'i-lien-shan, the Nan-shan, or the Southern Mountains. This mountain range forms the natural boundary between Kansu to the north and Chinghai to the south. There are a few passes situated in this mountain range with an average height of 12,900 feet. The length of the Chi-lien-shan is roughly estimated at 570 miles. Its east end is dissected by the streams of the upper Yellow River into a few isolated

THE FAMILY

I. Introduction

Northwest China is heavily populated by national minorities. In the province of Sinkiang, the Chinese even form a minority group and the Turkic Moslems constitute the majority. Therefore, in a discussion of the family in this area, general statements applying to the population as a whole would not apply, but a distinction has to be made between several different ethnic elements.

For the purposes of the present section, the following rough division suggests itself: (a) Turkic sedentary Moslems; (b) Turkic nomadic Moslems; (c) the Dungans or Chinese Moslems; (d) the Tibetans; (e) the Mongours; (f) the Mongols, and (g) the Chinese. The last two groups are discussed in detail in their respective handbooks, the IMAR Handbook and the General Handbook of China.

Among all Moslems Islam forms the ideal concept of the family. In Islamic society the institution of the family has always been one of primary importance. The family is considered the basic essential of human civilization. Having a family, and being a dutiful member of one, is not only regarded as necessary, but is expressly a religious obligation. Marriage, the step leading to the establishment of a family, is a sacred contract into which each Moslem must enter. A Moslem who, without just reason, does not marry and does not establish a family, is considered almost as a heretic.

The family's function is primarily for reproduction of the group and the continuation of the family. The institution of the family, furthermore, provides security and peace of mind for its members. The family man is respected and esteemed in Moslem society; he is considered honorable and trustworthy. An unmarried man is likely to be looked upon with some suspicion and distrust.

Since the family plays such a significant role in Moslem society, there is great emphasis on its unity and closeness. This is probably best expressed in the following quotation from the Koran, "...and Allah has made wives for you from yourselves and has given you sons and daughters from your wives." This closeness resulting from the blood relationship is extended to all other phases of family life.

Love and compassion should underlie all the relationships within the family. In relations between a man and his wife, or wives, between one kin to another, love is stressed as the basis. A man's behavior within his family reflects his attitude toward society as a whole. If there is love in his heart for his family, he will also have compassion for others and be of service to society.

In the family, the man's position is always superior to that of the woman, regardless of his age. The wife is, accordingly, put in an inferior position to that of her husband, being under his control completely. The head of the house holds unquestioned authority

V. The Tibetans of Chinghai

A. The Family Organization

581 59 63 Among the Tibetans of Northwest China almost any form of marriage that will further the family interests is acceptable. Property and the problems of serving it, avoiding its division, and increasing it, seem to underlie most marital variations. Monogamy, polygyny, and fraternal polyandry exist with various modifications, and the nuclear structure of the family differs accordingly. 563 592 The most common and least complicated arrangement in this region is that of a husband, his wife, and their unmarried children. The family may also include several grandchildren born [848] to unwed daughters. Considerable freedom is allowed to young [836] people before marriage and their offspring are accepted without reservation. Sons often will stay with their parents after marriage, [591] and sons often bring their wives into the family and remain with *563 their parents. A daughter also may bring her husband into her 583 family, but this occurs generally when the family has no sons. 591 The Mag pa (male bride) suffers no disgrace. He joins his wife's family, and if the family is sinified to the extent of having a family name, takes her family name. He calls her relatives his own, severs all relations with his own family, and assumes all the duties and rights of a son.

*563 595 Where polygyny occurs, the unit will include one or more additional wives, who will each live in her own tent, if the husband is rich enough, and if they do not get along together. Polyandry is not uncommon. In this case, the nuclear family includes the head of the household (the eldest married son), his brothers, his wife (or wives) and the children who are all considered his offspring, regardless of which brother is the actual father. *563 593 Parents usually retire to their own separate dwelling, as soon as their eldest son marries, and leave him the authority and the responsibilities of the head of the house.

*563 162 Tibetan families are not as large as either the Chinese or the Turkic. There are many attempts to explain this phenomenon, such as the prevalence of venereal diseases which have reduced their productivity considerably. Some refer to the hardships of rearing children in such a difficult and hostile climate, some claim the desire to space until child "no longer needs milk" (ca. 4 yrs), others blame the facts of polyandry and the celebacy of a large portion of the male population.

*563 593 182 The focus of the family is on the sons, who provide for the continuity of the family . There is much greater degree of stability and permanency in the Tibetan family than there is in the Turkic family. Sons can fulfill obligations to the State, such as military service and tax collecting. They help to preserve estates and

/Tibetans of Chinghai/

*563 avoid increased assessments.
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(182) The relationships between husband and wife have no religious basis. The Tibetan woman has a great degree of freedom: she (562) has an opportunity to choose her mate. Women also have certain -84) property rights, which give them a more secure position in the household and in the society as a whole. However, a Tibetan woman does not enjoy full equality with the men.

3 The family is held together chiefly by economic factors. Fre-12 quent migrations and the scarcity of sources of livelihood necessitate close family cooperation. Individual opportunities are practically non-existent, except for joining the clergy. Otherwise it (591) is very rare for a son to leave his father's household, and start living on his own. This may occur, when a son wants to marry against the wishes of his parents; or when a younger brother is dissatisfied with his secondary position in the family and does not get along with his eldest brother.

*563 Where fraternal polyandry is practiced, the relationships
595 between the brothers are naturally very close. They all are con-
593 cerned with and derive a living from a common property. They all share the same house and the same wife.

The Tibetans are not very conscious of the existence of a clan
*563 system but they do have some regulations influencing their rela-
582 tionships within the framework of the clan. They cannot marry
(614) their blood relations of the degree of first and second cousins on either side. A younger brother is permitted to marry the widow of his elder brother and the father is permitted to marry the widow of his son. The children of tribal chiefs have to conclude marriage
*563 with people from the same social level of other tribes. Allegiance
619 to the tribe is stressed. Tribal relationships involve many obligations from its individual members, as well as prerogatives derived from belonging to this social and political grouping.

*563 B. Marriage and Divorce Customs
582 The Tibetan boys marry around the age of 16-20 and usually
584 take a girl a year or two younger than they are. Marriage either may be arranged for the couple by their parents or contracted by themselves. The first is true particularly for the children of tribal chiefs and high officials. To find one who matches them in power and status, marriage must be arranged with another chiefly family. This is usually done through the parents.

*563 Should the parents select a mate for their child, the boy's
584 father looks for a bride for his son. When he has a girl in mind,
(987) he sends a middle man to her father to discuss the matter. If her family is interested, the boy's and girl's horoscopes are given to the lamas who decide if the two parties fit harmoniously. After the lamas have given their approval, the next step in concluding the marriage is taken. The bridegroom's family sends gifts to

/Chinese Moslems/

000 acter Hui signifying "to return."

S N 795 361 The Chinese Moslems live in small, closely knit communities, organized around the mosques. The Moslem community is usually set apart from the general Chinese community. The Moslems may form a whole village, or a certain suburb or section of town. The communities are organized on a local basis and there is no higher religious authority that unites all the communities. The mosques, the religious and social centers of the Moslem communities, are maintained independently.

S N 795 182 At least ostensibly, the religious attitude of the Chinese Moslims is characterized by moderation. They make concessions to the ruling power, hoping thus to gain security for person and property. The more capable and resolute of those who enter into government service take part in the ceremonial of the national cult.

S N 795 794 [346] The Moslems in the Northwest do not publicly practice their religion, nor do they advertise it. In some cases their mosques are dissimulated, so that they cannot be distinguished easily from other houses in the village. They are quite lax in their observances of the different rituals connected with Islam. The Chinese Moslems do not regularly attend religious services in the mosque. Aside from the ahung (the religious leader of the Chinese Moslem community) and the extremely orthodox people they do not pray five times a day, but once or twice at most. The noon service is the most popular one, and the place of worship is limited to the mosque. The manner of calling for prayer differs in China from that in Western Asia. The Muazzin does not chant the call to prayer. He stands on the roof of the mosque and shouts the invitation to prayer and may strike a special wooden instrument called ta-p'an-tzu. Most Moslems will ignore the worship time if it interferes with their daily business. Except for some minor differences, the prayer ceremony is conducted in a manner similar to that in Western Asia.

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S N [562] Women are not allowed to attend the mosques where the men pray. In some of the larger communities, the women may have a mosque of their own, but in most places they worship individually.

The Friday service draws the best attendance, although certainly not all nor even the majority of believers. On this day the sermon is delivered by the Khatib, a special person, not necessarily a religious leader, elected for the purpose. It is usually in Arabic, and few of those present can understand it.

S N 795 785 203 [184] The Fast of Ramadan is one of the rituals which is observed with a degree of strictness in Moslem communities throughout China. In many places there are special messengers who go about the Moslem quarters calling out the times for observing and breaking the fast. Messengers also go around at night lest

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771 "The traditions, the rituals, the basic and essential relation-
182 ships which govern men's intercourse, control the small circle
living in such far-away places as rigidly as they control the
N family which dwells in one of China's great cities. Both act ac-
769 cording to principles laid down by ancestors, whose control is
so subtle and so little questioned as to leave no room for the
spontaneous and the unusual." (Cable and French, The Gobi
Desert, 165-166.)

Chinese settlers in Sinkiang of course reflect the religious
71 characteristics of their origin. Among the old settlers, who
195 came into the country with Tso Tsung-t'ang, the secret society
[575] tradition is still strong. Merchants, mostly from Tientsin,
almost universally belong to the Tsai-li sect which forbids its
adherents indulgence in drinking and smoking.

IV. Religion under the Communists

N
795 A. Islam
*668 When they were fighting for the supremacy of China in the
177 years following World War II and when they first came to power
in 1949, the Chinese Communists promised religious freedom
to the national minorities in an effort to gain their support.
Article 53 of the Common Program of the CPPCC, promulgated
in September, 1949, stated that "the national minorities shall
have freedom to develop their dialects and languages, to pre-
serve or reform their traditions, customs and religious be-
liefs." Mosques were promised exemption from taxes and
Article 3 of the Agrarian Reform Law, published in June 1950,
which decreed the confiscation of the land belonging to ancestral
shrines, Buddhist temples and Christian churches and schools,
provided for the retention of land by the mosques, subject to the
wishes of local Moslem residents. As a further effort to win
over the Moslem population of the Northwest, the Government
Administration Council issued in December, 1950, a directive
permitting the observance of the festivals of Id-el-Fitr, Corban
and Molid Nabawi. It abolished tax on the slaughter of cattle for
celebration of these festivals and permitted holidays for cadres,
soldiers, workers and students of Moslem faith. State trading
companies were instructed to sell daily necessities to the Mos-
lems, during these festivals, at reduced prices.

These pronouncements made up the sum total of what the
propaganda of the Chinese Communists called the "policy of
N benevolence" toward the national minorities. They were given
[798] tremendous publicity which served to overshadow the grimmer
and more gory record of persecution of the Moslem peoples in
the Northwest. The reasons for the ostensible policy of toler-

1: Washington S-4 (no date) 1956 AF13 Northwest China AF13

Democratic Dictatorship, 1949), the term "citizen" is restricted to certain select classes of people, not all the people.

Moreover, as the Communist officials have frankly stated, toleration would be granted to only religious faiths which (1) have been purified of foreign influences and "feudal superstitions," (2) contribute toward the increase of production, and (3) do not conflict with the teachings of Marx, Lenin and Mao Tse-tung. In other words, the Chinese Communists sanction only religions that have been tamed, domesticated, and cleansed of political coloration.

In the implementation of this policy of the Central People's Government, Burkhan, governor of Sinkiang, announced in February, 1955, that only "legal religious activities would be permitted by the people's government," because, he said, "individual counter-revolutionary elements have infiltrated into Islam and, under the cloak of religion, are carrying on counter-revolutionary activities." (Sinkiang jih-pao, February 25, 1955.)

The stiffening of Chinese Communist policy toward the adherents of Islam represented, actually, no radical change but rather the shedding of the pretense of benevolence toward the nationality minorities whose attachment to their religion was stronger than their allegiance to the state. It represented, too, a recognition by the Chinese Communists of the fundamental differences between Islam and Communism and of the impossibility of rationalizing these differences. Islam, with its strong social principles for the regulation of state and homelife, conflicts with the totalitarianism of Communism. As Moslem leaders of Asian countries have pointed out, Communism advocates the use of force against those who would not readily accede to it; Islam teaches men to bring others to follow the way of God by peaceful means. Communism does not respect the sanctity of human life, but teaches violence and favors the organization of society based upon atheism and anti-religion; Islam provides for individual rights and freedom, and encourages humanitarian services, compassionate feeling toward all living beings, apart from devotion to God.

Besides being a religion, Islam in Chinese Turkestan has also been a strong political force welding the multi-racial groups together in their struggle for self-rule and their resistance to oppression. The insurrections of the Moslems against the Chinese in the beginning of the nineteenth century have been led by religious leaders, the Khojas; the widespread uprisings of the Moslems in the 1860's were led by Ma Hua-lung, the leader of the New Sect, in Kansu, and by Yakub Beg, who bore the title of Commander of the Faithful, in Kashgaria.

The demands of the natives of Sinkiang for independence were

000 almost every phase of their lives.

*668 631 • 182 The functions of the people's councils, reveal the contradictory character of the Communist system of local government. The Councils are responsible for carrying out decisions of the people's congresses at their corresponding levels, but they also have to carry out all decisions and orders from higher-level government organs. The people's councils are the servants of the people, but they also are entrusted with stopping the execution of inappropriate decisions of people's congresses at the next lowest level. This power is especially significant since the higher people's councils must decide what decisions are inappropriate.

c. bureaus, offices and commissions

*668 649 635 631 The Organic Law for local governments states that the provincial people's councils may establish the following bureaus, offices, or commissions according to local needs:

(1) Civil Affairs;
(2) Public Security;
(3) Justice;
(4) Supervision;
(5) Planning;
(6) Finance;
(7) Food;
(8) Industry;
(9) Commerce;
(10) Transportation and Communications;
(11) Agriculture and Forestry;
(12) Water Conservancy;
(13) Labor;
(14) Culture;
(15) Education;
(16) Public Health;
(17) Physical Culture;
(18) Administrative Office.

[563] In areas where there are minority groups, the councils may also add a Commission on Nationalities Affairs.

So far, no material is available concerning the actual structure of the northwestern provinces under the new law. However, it is known that the Committee on Financial and Economic Affairs and the Committee on Cultural and Educational Affairs have been abolished.

*668 649 632 631 Under the new law, the municipal people's council may establish the following bureaus, offices, or commissions:

(1) Civil Affairs;
(2) Public Safety;
(3) Justice;
(4) Supervision;
(5) Planning;